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The American Law of General Jurisdiction
Friedrich K Juengert
American jurisdictional law is unique. First of all, other na-
tions-both in the civil and the common law orbit-usually have
a national "long-arm statute" that delineates the scope of general
and specific jurisdiction.' While we rely on such open-ended con-
cepts as "minimum contacts" or "purposeful availment," these
foreign enactments enumerate, with considerable specificity and
admirable clarity, the jurisdictional bases available for interna-
tional litigation. These bases do not necessarily coincide, in other
federal systems, with those used domestically. Even more impor-
tantly, other nations do not consider jurisdiction a constitutional
matter. Although the Swiss Constitution formerly enshrined the
maxim actor sequitur forum rei2 by requiring lawsuits to be
brought at the defendant's domicile, this provision specified that
it was subject to legislation that would set forth additional juris-
dictional bases.' Thus, we are the only nation in the world to
leave jurisdiction to a motley array of (frequently poorly drafted)
state statutes,4 whose application to specific cases is subject to a
vacillating and confused Supreme Court case law. The historical
roots of the differences between our jurisdictional notions and
those that prevail in the rest of the world also help explain the
peculiarities of general jurisdiction as conceived in the United
f Tragically, Professor Juenger passed away before this article was completed. The
text of the article-except for the conclusion-is entirely his work, with only the slightest
editorial modifications. The conclusion was written by his former student Dean Patrick J.
Borchers of the Creighton University School of Law, and is based upon conversations
between Dean Borchers and Professor Juenger regarding, in particular, how Professor
Juenger wished to respond to Professor Epstein's paper. Professor Juenger drafted many
of the footnotes; they were completed and additional footnotes were added by Dean
Borchers and the editors of the Legal Forum.
1 For a general discussion, see Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story
of Comparative Neglect, 65 U Colo L Rev 1, 17-18 (1993) (comparing American jurisdic-
tional law with that of European Union).
2 "The plaintiff follows the forum of the property in suit of the forum of the defen-
dant's residence." Black's Law Dictionary 34 (West 6th ed 1990).
3 See Thomas Pfeiffer, Internationale Zustandigkeit und prozessuale Gerechtigkeit
329-31 (Klostermann 1995) (comparing German jurisdictional rules to Swiss).
4 Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev at 2 (cited in note 1) (discussing Texas, Rhode Island, and
California jurisdictional provisions).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
States. Indeed, without considering its evolution, neither the
principles nor the details of American jurisdictional law can be
fully understood. It is therefore necessary to reiterate here what
has been said and commented upon many times, and often better,
by other legal writers.
I. GENERAL AND SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
A. A Note on Terminology
The terms "general" and "specific" jurisdiction were appar-
ently coined by von Mehren and Trautman in the 1960s.' Since
the Supreme Court adopted them, they have become part and
parcel of the American procedural vocabulary. The former signi-
fies the defendant's "dispute-blind" amenability to suits on any
cause of action, whether or not the litigation has any connection
with the forum.' In contrast, specific jurisdiction refers to the
court's "dispute-specific" power to adjudicate those causes of ac-
tion that are in some fashion related to the defendant's forum
activities.7 A further category, to which this paper will occasion-
ally refer, is the so-called "exorbitant" jurisdiction, yet another
turn of phrase that has become a term of art.8 This category en-
compasses assertions of general jurisdiction in cases where nei-
ther defendant nor the dispute have contacts with the forum that
suffice to make the exercise of adjudicatory power reasonable.
Commonly noted examples include Article 14 of the French Civil
Code,9 which confers upon French plaintiffs the privilege of suing
aliens on any cause of action in a French court, and section 23 of
5 See Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv L Rev 1121, 1135-36, 1164-66 (1966) (defining "specific
jurisdiction" and "general jurisdiction"). See also Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National
Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic
Courts, 36 Harv Intl L J 373, 378 n 25 (1995) ("The distinction between specific and gen-
eral jurisdiction was first suggested by Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman.").
6 See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv L Rev 610, 613
(1988) (tracing the history of the concepts of "specific" and "general" jurisdiction and argu-
ing for a return to their original meanings).
7 See id at 618-630.
8 See Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 Brooklyn J Intl L 7, 9 (2000) (noting that un-
der European Union law, entities and individuals not domiciled in the European Union
may be subject to litigation based on heads of jurisdiction recognized as "exorbitant" and
"impermissible" against any domiciliary of the European Union).
9 Code Civil Art 14 (France) (establishing unlimited general jurisdiction over any
defendant where plaintiff is a French national).
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the German Code of Civil Procedure, ° according to which the
ownership of German assets renders nonresidents amenable to
full in personam jurisdiction."
B. An Age-Old Distinction
1. Roman law.
Although the terminology is of recent vintage, the distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction is ancient. 2 Long before
the common law came into existence, the Romans acknowledged
the principle that a court's power to adjudicate depends on the
relationship of the defendant or the dispute with the forum. Thus
Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis distinguished between actions
brought in the defendant's domicile, where he was amenable to
jurisdiction for any cause of action, and those agairist nonresi-
dents on, for example, contracts made or to be performed there. 3
In the latter case, the forum's power to adjudicate was limited to
causes of action arising from the contractual relationship. This
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction still prevails
not only in the domestic rules of civil law countries but also in
international compacts such as the Brussels and Lugano Conven-
tions.
2. England.
In marked contrast, the English common law courts made
the exercise of jurisdiction dependent not on the defendant's or
the dispute's contacts with the forum, but rather on an official
act, namely the service of process on the defendant. 4 That act
conferred general jurisdiction: a defendant who was served in
England was amenable to the common law courts' jurisdiction,
whether or not he or the dispute had any contacts with the scep-
ter'd isle. By the same token, a defendant who could not be served
there could not be sued, whatever contacts the transaction under-
10 Zivilprozessordung § 23 (Germany).
11 See Arthur T. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared
and Evaluated, 63 BU L Rev 279, 284 & nn 12-13 (1983) (discussing jurisdiction under
both French and German law).
12 Consider Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 8-10 (Mar-
tinus Nijhoff 1993).
13 Justinian's Code, cod 3.19.3, 3.13.2. See also Juenger, Choice of Law at 8-10 (cited
in note 12).
14 For a general discussion, see Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev at 6 (cited in note 1) (tracing
the evolution of English common law jurisdiction).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
lying the dispute might have with England.15 Once the common
law courts began to handle maritime and commercial cases, these
archaic jurisdictional notions no longer suited a country with far-
flung commercial activities. Responding to business necessities,
the 1875 Common Law Procedure Act authorized a species of
long-arm jurisdiction. 6 Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, which was promulgated pursuant to this statute, conferred
upon the judiciary discretion to serve abroad defendants who
could not be found in the United Kingdom. 7 Framed-bowing to
tradition-in terms of service of process, it in effect introduced
the concept of specific jurisdiction, so that this scheme amounted
to a reform that reflected the civil law approach. 8
3. United States.
Although early American law followed the English common
law tradition, the notion of specific jurisdiction was not entirely
unknown in the United States. In an 1856 decision, Lafayette In-
surance Co v French,9 the Supreme Court upheld the assertion of
jurisdiction over an Indiana insurance company by an Ohio court
pursuant to an Ohio statute that allowed the service of process on
the "agents" of foreign insurers. ° The Court reasoned that be-
cause foreign corporations can only transact business within an-
other state with that state's consent, that permission can be con-
ditioned on the defendant's submission to the jurisdiction of the
state's courts. Providing its citizens with a remedy by requiring
foreign corporations that carry on insurance business in Ohio "to
answer there for the breach of their contracts of insurance there
made and to be performed" was held not to be unreasonable. 2'
Hence, as regards suits on such contracts, Ohio did not violate
the United States Constitution by treating the local sales agent of
a foreign corporation that transacts continuous business in Ohio
as an authorized agent for service. Rather, by virtue of this fic-
tional consent the host state could do so "as effectually as if he
15 Juenger, Choice of Law at 22 (cited in note 12).
16 Common Law Procedure Act, 38 & 39 Victoria Ch 77 (1875) (permitting service
abroad).
17 See Friedrich K. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the
European Communities, 82 Mich L Rev 1195, 1197 n 16 (1984) (discussing the evolution of
English jurisdictional rules).
18 Id at 1197.
19 59 US (18 Howard) 404 (1856).
20 Id at 407-08.
21 Id.
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were designated in the charter as the officer on whom process
was to be served."" Again, jurisdiction was ostensibly based on
that procedural act. But by limiting jurisdiction to causes of ac-
tion arising out of the nonresident corporation's local activities,
the Court implicitly recognized the concept of specific jurisdiction.
The Lafayette Insurance Co case could therefore have become the
starting point for aligning American jurisdictional law with that
of the common law's cradle as well as civil law countries. This
possibility vanished, however, once the Court handed down a
fateful decision that seriously inhibited sensible reform.
II. PENNOYER V NEFF
A. Constitutionalizing an Old Common Law Rule
The peculiarities of current American jurisdictional law are a
consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer v Neff.23
That case struck down a judgment an Oregon court rendered
against a California resident pursuant to a state statute, which
(like section 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure)24 pur-
ported to authorize in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents
who own property in Oregon. Accordingly, the judgment nullified
the title to a plot of land, which had served as the requisite basis
for a default judgment against the Californian defendant, after
the land was sold to a third party at a sheriff's sale in order to
satisfy the judgment. In so holding, the Court gave constitutional
stature to the old common law principle that jurisdiction must be
acquired by serving the defendant with process. Citing Story's
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws and Wheaton on Interna-
tional Law, Justice Field's majority opinion maintained that this
rule was mandated by principles of "public law," that is interna-
tional law.25 According to the law of nations, he reasoned, a sover-
eign state has plenary power-in other words, general jurisdic-
tion-over all things and persons within its territory but none
outside.26 Thus, Justice Field believed that these principles were
22 Id (emphasis added).
23 95 US 714 (1877).
24 Zivilprozessordung § 23. Unlike the German provision, however, the Oregon statute
limited the judgment to the value of the Oregon assets.
25 Pennoyer, 95 US at 722 (stating that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory" but that "the laws of one
State have no operation outside its territory").
26 Id.
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still pertinent to our federal system except to the extent that the
Constitution constrains state court jurisdiction.
For this reason the Court held that Oregon lacked in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the California defendant, who had not
been not served with process within the state's borders. By way of
dictum, the Court also took the opportunity to put its seal of ap-
proval on quasi in rem jurisdiction.27 Relying again on notions of
territorial sovereignty, Justice Field maintained that the Oregon
plaintiff did not have to rely on the state's long-arm provision.28
Rather, he could proceed directly against the California defen-
dant's Oregon property, which would allow him to vindicate his
rights incidental to such an in rem proceeding. Unlike earlier Su-
preme Court cases, the Pennoyer opinion premised the scope of
permissible state court jurisdiction not on the Full Faith and
Credit Clause but on the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.29 Even though its purpose was the protection
of individual liberties rather than state sovereignty, Justice Field
had no qualms about invoking this provision. He believed that
the new provision was relevant because he construed the words
"due process" to imply "a course of legal proceedings according to
those rules and principles which have been established in our
systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of
private rights."" In other words, Justice Field took the position
that only those means of acquiring jurisdiction that existed in the
common law inherited from England accorded with due process, a
proposition for which he was able to cite Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations."
B. Pennoyer's Shortcomings
The Pennoyer opinion was thoroughly flawed. Although draw-
ing an analogy to international law, Justice Field nevertheless
failed to seek guidance from the jurisdictional rules of other civi-
lized nations. Indeed, although he relied on a common law heri-
tage, he did not even consider English developments that
27 Id at 723.
28 Id at 723-24, 733.
29 This point is debatable, however. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Consti-
tutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24
UC Davis L Rev 19, 38-40 (1990) (arguing that Pennoyer's reference to "due process"
might have merely established a right of collateral attack and that full constitutionaliza-
tion of jurisdictional rules was not clearly established until 1915).
30 Pennoyer, 95 US at 733.
31 Id.
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changed the "rules and principles which have been established in
our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement
of private rights."32 His opinion did not refer to the Common Law
Procedure Act and Order 11, nor did it cite such cases as Schibsby
v Westenholz 3 that reflected then-current English practice, which
by that time supplemented the general jurisdiction created by
service with a dispute-specific power to adjudicate.34 By failing to
recognize the concept of specific jurisdiction, Pennoyer was out of
tune with the times. Even in those horse-and-buggy days, the
exclusive reliance on process servers and tracers of assets made
little sense in a federal system that harbors a mobile population
and a burgeoning economy. Catch-as-catch-can jurisdiction,
which was found wanting even in a unitary English legal system35
with more sedentary inhabitants, defied common sense because it
imposed a Procrustean scheme that was at once too broad and too
narrow.
36
Jurisdiction A la Pennoyer was too broad because it author-
ized litigation in states with which the defendant had little or no
contacts, as' cases like Grace v MacArthur" dramatically illus-
trate. There an Arkansas federal court proceeded to adjudicate a
case in which jurisdiction was premised on service in the Arkan-
sas airspace over which the defendant happened to fly. Although
American legal scholars have sharply criticized such jurisdic-
tional exorbitance, 39 not too long ago a Supreme Court plurality
opinion, relying on Pennoyer, affirmed the continued validity of
this species of general jurisdiction,4 ° even though an earlier deci-
32 Id.
33 6 QB 155 (1870).
34 Id at 157, 159 (discussing French practice under Code Civil Art 14 and English
practice under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, ch 76 §§ 18 & 19).
35 Scotland, however, has some distinct legal traditions that survived integration. See
Donald W. Large, The Land Law of Scotland-A Comparison with American and English
Concepts, 17 Envir L 1, 3 (1986).
36 Juenger, Choice of Law at 22-25 (cited in note 12) (comparing the jurisdictional
scheme under the common law in England to the Pennoyer decision).
31 170 F Supp 442 (E D Ark 1959).
38 Id at 443.
39 See, for example, Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction Especially Over International
Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U Ill L
Rev 593 (1990) (discussing malign implications for international litigants); Marcel Kahan
and Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in Class Actions: A Critique
of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 NYU L Rev 765 (1998) (discussing problem of forum shopping
that can arise in class action suits under an exorbitant approach to jurisdiction); Albert A.
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 Yale L J 289 (1956) (discussing impact on conflicts-of-law).
40 Burnham v Superior Court of California, 495 US 604, 607, 619-22 (1990).
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sion suggested that the Justices were ready to abolish it." More-
over, since Pennoyer, numerous judges have taken issue with
premising the power to adjudicate on such a tenuous contact, es-
pecially in international cases.42 As a Connecticut judge, writing
not long after Pennoyer, decried:
It can hardly be claimed that the interests of our own citi-
zens, or friendly intercourse with other nations, will be
served by encouraging the establishment of a sort of inter-
national syndicate for promoting the collection of home
debts through foreign courts .... Such a policy would offer
premiums to scavengers of sham and stale claims at every
center of travel, breeding a class of process firers to lie in
wait for their game at docks and railway stations.43
Premising litigation on quasi in rem jurisdiction, which is
designed to vindicate personal claims through the attachment of
local assets, is equally unsatisfactory." Such exorbitance ulti-
mately displeased the Court sufficiently to induce the abolition of
this hoary practice.45
Although Pennoyer promoted jurisdictional exorbitance, it
also confined the power of state courts to adjudicate actions
brought against nonresidents to an intolerable degree. The ar-
chaic common law heritage it promoted and constitutionalized
could not possibly accommodate the needs of a federal system.
Actions against foreign corporations, for instance, were already a
fact of American life and commerce when the Court handed down
Pennoyer.4 s Yet, process servers were and are unable to stalk arti-
ficial entities that lack a corporeal presence. An analogy to the
exercise of jurisdiction over human beings, taken to its logical
conclusion, would mean that only the state of incorporation could
adjudicate actions against such entities because they do not exist
41 See Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186, 212 (1977) (stating that "all assertions of state
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny").
42 See, for example, Fisher v Fielding, 34 A 714, 729 (Conn 1895) (Hamersley dissent-
ing).
43 Id.
44 Pennoyer, 95 US at 723.
45 Shaffer, 433 US at 207-12 (stating the case for applying International Shoe's
minimum-contacts standard to in rem and quasi in rem cases).
46 See, for example, Myer v Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance Co, 40 Md 595
(1874) (subjecting foreign corporation to garnishment within a state where it holds prop-
erty); Martine v International Life Insurance Society of London, 53 NY 339 (1873) (subject-
ing foreign life insurance company to New York law).
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elsewhere. 47 This dire consequence did not, however, bother Jus-
tice Field. In St Clair v Cox 4' he held that the "doctrine of...
[Pennoyerl applies, in all its force, to personal judgments of State
courts against foreign corporations."49 Later, when the automobile
became a popular means of transportation, nonresident motorists
could evade lawsuits in states in which their vehicles maimed or
killed hapless victims by flooring the gas pedal. Mandated-as it
supposedly was-by constitutional tenets, the decision in Pen-
noyer inhibited the states from searching for more sensible solu-
tions to these problems. It therefore fell to the Supreme Court to
cope, as best it could, with the difficulties its noxious precedent
had caused.
C. Jurisdictional Facts and Fictions
1. Corporations.
During the following decades, the normative force of facts
compelled the Supreme Court to adapt the Pennoyer principles to
the realities of our federal system. Hoisted by their own petard,
however, the Justices apparently felt unable to do so directly; in-
stead they resorted to a number of contrivances to accommodate
the system's jurisdictional necessities. As construed in Pennoyer,
the Due Process Clause did provide some leeway for creative solu-
tions. Personal service within the state was not an indispensable
prerequisite for the forum's power to adjudicate cases brought
against nonresidents since a defendant could waive the protection
that clause afforded by entering an appearance or consenting to
jurisdiction. ° An early Supreme Court decision, which had sug-
gested that legal entities could only be sued in their state of in-
corporation,51 had already prompted the states to enact legisla-
tion that required foreign corporations that wished to do business
47 Pennoyer, 95 US at 726.
48 106 US 350 (1882).
49 Id at 353.
50 Pennoyer, 95 US at 723.
51 See Bank of Augusta v Earle, 38 US 519, 588 (1839). In Bank of Augusta the Court
held that:
It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the
boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in con-
templation of law; and where that law ceases to operate and is no longer
obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the
place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.
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in the forum to consent to local jurisdiction. Although such con-
sent alone should obviate the need for personal service within the
forum state, for good measure these "qualification statutes" also
provided for service within the state.12 They accomplished this by
requiring nonresident enterprises to appoint a local person-
usually the secretary of state-as their "true and lawful agent" on
whom service could be effected. 3 Such statutes provided an in-
centive for compliance by means of stringent sanctions.54 These
included, in addition to fines, voiding agreements to which non-
compliant foreign corporations were parties and depriving them
of the capacity to hold and dispose of property.5 Undisturbed by
the fact that such "consent" was obtained in an extortionate
manner, the Supreme Court held that nonresident corporations
were bound by it."
A line of Supreme Court decisions had, however, held that
there were limits on the conditions for doing business locally that
a state might impose on corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce. Several state statutes were held to have transgressed
those limits, which shed doubt on the propriety of subjecting such
entities to local jurisdiction.5" Also, stringent sanctions notwith-
standing, a foreign corporate defendant might have either failed
to appoint a local agent in the first place or revoked his authority
before a suit was filed. How, then, could it be sued? Notwith-
standing earlier authority that seemingly permitted this expedi-
ent,58 in Goldey v Morning News of New Haven,59 the Supreme
Court rebuffed an attempt to anthropomorphize corporations and
refused to equate service on corporate officials with service on the
corporation. It said that such service "must be regarded as of no
validity... unless... [it] was made ... upon an agent appointed
52 See, for example, St Clair, 106 US at 353, citing 2 Michigan Comp Laws §§ 6544,
6550 (1871) (noting that states may require non-residents entering into a partnership or
association within its limits to appoint a local agent or representative to receive service of
process).
53 See, for example, 1959 Tex Gen Laws 43, amended by 1979 Tex Gen Law 245, re-
pealed by 1985 Tex Gen Laws 959.
54 See, for example, id.
55 See, for example, id.
56 See, for example, St Clair, 106 US at 353; Pennoyer, 95 US at 735.
57 See Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev at 10-13 (cited in note 1).
58 See, for example, Lafayette Insurance Co, 59 US (18 Howard) at 408 ("The law may
and ordinarily does, designate the agent or officer on whom process is to be served. For the
purpose of receiving such service and being bound by it, the corporation is identified with
such agent or officer."); Pope v Terre Haute Car & Manufacturing Co, 87 NY 137, 141
(1881) (holding that an officer need not be served while conducting corporate business in
order to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations).
59 156 US 518 (1895).
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to act there for the corporation, and not merely upon an officer or
agent.., only casually within the state and not charged with any
business of the corporation there.""
As a consequence, fiction substituted for fact. If actual con-
sent could not be obtained, "constructive" consent had to do; if
members of its management could not be Pennoyered, perhaps
the corporation itself might be "deemed" to have a local "pres-
ence." As noted earlier, in Lafayette Insurance Co, the Supreme
Court had already held that transacting certain kinds of business
within a state amounted to an "implied consent" to be served with
process there.61 Later cases held that a corporation doing a suffi-
cient volume of business in the forum may be deemed to be "pre-
sent" for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction.62 To hold nonresi-
dent entities amenable to local jurisdiction, the courts sometimes
relied on one of these fictions, sometimes on the other. In fact,
they often treated "implied consent" and "presence" as inter-
changeable concepts despite the fact that there was an important
difference between the two.63 Pennoyer permitted state courts to
exercise general jurisdiction over natural persons who were
served within the forum state while present there. In contrast,
the very concept of consent suggests that a nonresident corpora-
tion need not necessarily be subject to suits on any causes of ac-
tion that might be brought in the state to whose jurisdiction it
consented. Rather, as Lafayette Insurance Co implied, consent
depended on the defendant's volition; it might choose to be ame-
nable only to certain kinds of lawsuits. In other words, while
"presence" implied general jurisdiction, "consent" may engender
specific jurisdiction only. This obvious difference was, however,
further obliterated when judges subsumed both of these fictions
under the notion of "doing business."
In a way, "doing business" is a more satisfactory term to ex-
plain jurisdiction over foreign corporations than the two fictive
ones, both of which were in reality premised on the defendant's
60 Id at 522.
61 Lafayette Insurance Co, 59 US (18 Howard) at 408 (noting that "express or implied"
consent to transact business in a state may be accompanied by such conditions as the
state may think fit to impose).
62 See Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co v McKibbin, 243 US 264, 268 (1917) (find-
ing sales of tickets on foreign railways within country's jurisdiction insufficient). Compare
International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 317 (1945) ("Presence in the State ...
has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation have ... been continuous
and systematic.").
63 See, for example, St Louis Southwestern Railway Co of Texas v Alexander, 227 US
218 (1913) (analyzing a Texas corporations "presence" in New York).
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commercial activities within the state. As Judge Learned Hand
put it in Hutchinson v Chase & Gilbert Inc,64 jurisdiction depends
on "whether the extent and continuity of what [the corporation]
has done in the state in question makes it reasonable to bring it
before one of its courts."65 In other words, as is true in other coun-
tries, in Hand's opinion, the amenability of nonresidents to suit is
a consequence not of the magic act of service or an unexpressed
consent, but rather on the defendant's relationship with the fo-
rum.66 Looking at the matter in this fashion raises the obvious
question whether forum activities are truly analogous to the
presence of a human defendant so as to subject a nonresident
corporation to general jurisdiction, or whether they should only
confer specific jurisdiction concerning actions that are related to
these activities, as the Supreme Court had held in Lafayette In-
surance Co.67 On this point, the Court has vacillated. In Old
Wayne Mutual Insurance Life Association v McDonough"5 it re-
fused to extend the notion of "implied consent" to a transaction
that had no relationship with the insurance business that the
foreign corporation conducted in the forum state. 9 In other cases,
the idea implicit in Pennoyer that "presence" allows the exercise
of general jurisdiction had induced the Court to allow actions
against nonresident corporations that were unrelated to the de-
fendant's forum activities. ° Most of the cases that reached the
Court dealt with the issue of how much is enough, in other words,
whether such forum activities as the solicitation of business are
sufficient to render the business amenable to local lawsuits.71
Their preoccupation with such details may explain the Justices'
failure to elaborate a satisfactory distinction between dispute-
specific and dispute-blind jurisdiction in suits against foreign
corporations.
The decisions of state and federal courts mirrored this confu-
sion. Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Hutchinson echoed that in
64 45 F2d 139 (2d Cir 1930).
65 Id at 141.
66 Id (describing presence as a "shorthand" for an estimate of the continuity of the
corporation's business within the forum state and the inconveniences of requiring the
corporation to defend itself where it has been sued).
67 See 59 US (18 Howard) at 408.
68 204 US 8 (1907).
69 See id at 21-23.
70 Hutchinson, 45 F2d at 139 (discussing Supreme Court cases allowing the exercise
of general jurisdiction against nonresident corporations).
71 See, for example, Quinn v Southern Railway, 236 US 115, 128-32 (1915); Old
Wayne Mutual Insurance Life Association, 204 US at 8.
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Lafayette'Insurance Co: Even though the corporate defendant had
engaged in "continuous dealings in the state of the forum,"72
Hand concluded that the foreign enterprise was amenable to ju-
risdiction only with respect to causes of action arising out of those
dealings.7" In this respect, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
deviated from the earlier New York Court of Appeals decision in
Tauza v Susquehanna Coal Co.74 Tauza dealt with an action
brought against a Pennsylvania company that maintained a
branch office in New York manned by a sales agent, clerical as-
sistants, and eight salesmen.75 The defendant, which regularly
sold coal to that state, was held amenable to general jurisdiction
in New York. 6 As Judge Cardozo's opinion in Tauza noted, "ju-
risdiction does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has
no relation ... to the business here transacted."77 Thus, the "do-
ing business" rubric thoroughly obscured the distinction between
dispute-blind and dispute-specific jurisdiction.
2. Cars.
The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction was,
however, posed succinctly in a different context. In Hess v Paw-
loski," the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
convoluted Massachusetts statute that relied on the fiction of im-
plied consent to authorize tort actions against nonresident motor-
ists who caused an accident in Massachusetts.79 The legislature
"deemed" driving in Massachusetts to be "equivalent to an ap-
pointment by such nonresident of the registrar ... to be his true
and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process
in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of any acci-
dent or collision in which said nonresident may be involved while
operating a motor vehicle" in the Commonwealth.8" Noting that
"the implied consent is limited to proceedings" arising out of local
accidents, the Supreme Court upheld that exercise of jurisdiction
against the defendant's due process challenge.81 Equating fact
72 Hutchinson, 45 F2d at 141.
73 Id.
74 115 NE 915 (NY 1917).
75 Id at 918.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 274 US 352 (1927).
79 Id at 356-57.
80 Id at 354.
81 Id at 356.
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with fiction, Justice Butler reached the remarkable conclusion
that the "difference between the formal and implied appointment
is not substantial, so far as concerns the application of the" Due
Process Clause.82 Apart from extending the implied consent fic-
tion beyond the corporate context, Hess clearly recognized the
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction as a matter
of constitutional law.8" In addition, the case increased the oppor-
tunities for suits against nonresidents by suggesting that juris-
diction may be appropriate even if a defendant did not engage in
a course of "continuous dealing" but merely committed a single
act within the forum state. 4
III. INTERNATIONAL SHOE Co v WASHINGTON
A. A New Jurisdictional Principle
Once the Supreme Court fully recognized the distinction be-
tween dispute-blind and dispute-specific jurisdiction, it was but a
short step to find a more plausible basis for in personam jurisdic-
tion than the questionable "physical power" rationale on which
Pennoyer had relied. Law, however, is a conservative business;
after it decided Hess, it took the Court yet another eighteen years
before it handed down its landmark decision in International
Shoe Co v Washington,"8 which, at long last, accomplished that
feat. In effect, International Shoe "civilized" in personam jurisdic-
tion by recognizing that a relationship (which the Court confus-
ingly dubbed "minimum contacts"), rather than the magic act of
service, may enable the forum to adjudicate actions against non-
residents.86 Such a relationship of course exists whenever the de-
fendant is a forum resident87 or, in the case of a legal entity, is
incorporated or has its principal place of business there. But what
should be the rule if a nonresident corporation merely conducts
business activities in the forum? As the citation of its own prece-
dents and the Tauza case indicates, the International Shoe Court
apparently felt bound by post-Pennoyer jurisprudence, which had
authorized the exercise of general in personam jurisdiction as
82 Hess, 274 US at 357.
83 Id at 355.
84 Id at 356-57.
85 326 US 310 (1945).
86 Id at 316-17.
87 See Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457 (1940) (finding domicile sufficient to establish
jurisdiction).
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long as the defendant was "doing business" in the forum state."8
Hence the International Shoe Court chose to continue along this
path and thereby to perpetuate the rift that separates this coun-
try from all others.
B. An Opportunity Missed
The International Shoe Court could have done better-as the
Pennoyer Court could have-by employing a comparative ap-
proach. As noted earlier, with respect to corporate defendants
that are neither incorporated nor have their principal place of
business in the forum state, civil law as well as common law na-
tions merely assert specific jurisdiction. 9 Had the Justices at
least looked at the practices in other common law countries, they
could have seized the opportunity to align American law with
that which prevails elsewhere. But instead of drawing a sharp
line between dispute-blind and dispute-specific jurisdiction, the
International Shoe opinion envisaged a spectrum of activities
ranging from "continuous and systematic" to "single or isolated"
acts. Whereas the latter would at best confer specific jurisdiction,
the former might authorize the forum to adjudicate causes of ac-
tion that are unrelated to the defendant's forum activities.9 ° As
might have been expected, these weasel words cause, to this day,
major problems in practical application. 1 Matters were hardly
improved by the fumbling attempts of state legislatures to avail
themselves of the greater leeway for jurisdictional innovation
that the International Shoe decision afforded. The Solons in the
state legislatures modeled their enactments on legislation
adopted during the Pennoyer era, in particular the nonresident
motorist statute that had won the Supreme Court's approval in
Hess.92
Yet another problematic aspect of the International Shoe de-
cision was the Court's steadfast adherence to the notion that jur-
isdiction and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
are somehow intertwined. While it no longer takes the position
88 See Part II C.
89 Unless, of course, the plaintiff can rely on an exorbitant jurisdictional basis such as
Civil Code Art 14 (France). See Part I.
90 See Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev at 7-10 (cited in note 1).
91 Compare McGee v International Life Insurance Co, 335 US 220 (1957) (emphasizing
transaction contacts) with Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 253 (1958) (emphasizing defen-
dant contacts).
92 See, for example, St Louis Southwestern Railway Co of Texas v Alexander, 227 US
218 (1917) (discussing a New York statute); 1995 Ill Laws 2245-46.
155
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
that the Constitution mandates reliance on archaic common law
practices, the Court reaffirmed its reliance on the Due Process
Clause as the pertinent constitutional provision from which jur-
isdiction is derived. 3 Engaging in a curious inversion of reason-
ing, instead of deriving constitutional propriety from pre-existing
jurisdictional ideas, Justice Stone's majority opinion deduced jur-
isdiction from the Fourteenth Amendment. According to him, Due
Process enables states to exercise jurisdiction as long as they
have "certain minimum contacts with ... [the defendant] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice'."94 It is no wonder that
this vague standard left state legislatures, judges, and practition-
ers bewildered. Unable to define these terms, the Court has since
handed down a series of decisions characterized by a lack of clar-
ity and cogency that have, at times, yielded questionable results.
Additional verbiage, such as "purposeful availment" through
which the Justices have embellished "minimum contacts," merely
adds to the confusion. 5 The Supreme Court's vacillating juris-
prudence has befuddled state and federal courts and fails to pro-
vide answers to even some obvious questions, such as where pre-
cisely the line between general and specific jurisdiction should be
drawn.9"
C. The Current Status of General Jurisdiction
Fifty-six years after International Shoe. was decided, we still
do not know when states may assert dispute-blind jurisdiction
over nonresident corporations. In International Shoe, Justice
Stone characterized the presence of the defendant's thirteen
salesmen, who roamed the State of Washington to solicit orders,
as "continuous and systematic."97 Specific jurisdiction was, how-
ever, the only issue presented because the defendant's tax liabil-
ity arose out of its local activities.98 Hence the opinion in that case
provides no clue concerning whether the defendant's "continuing
93 International Shoe, 326 US at 316 ("[D]ue process requires ... that... [the defen-
dant] have certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"), quoting Milliken v Meyer,
311 US 457, 463 (1940).
94 Id.
95 See, for example, Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court of California, 480 US
102, 108 (1987); Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 475 (1985); Hanson v
Denckla, 357 US 235, 253 (1958).
96 See Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev at 3-4 (cited in note 1) (citing cases).
97 International Shoe, 326 US at 320.
98 Id at 316.
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and systematic" activities might have permitted a Washington
court to adjudicate, say, a tort action by a person who was injured
by one of the International Shoe Company's trucks in Saint
Louis. Only one Supreme Court case decided after International
Shoe, Perkins v Benguet Consolidated Mining Co,99 has condoned
a state court's exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign or
out-of-state corporation. °° The facts presented by that case were,
however, unique: during the Japanese occupation of the Philip-
pines, the only "presence" the defendant Philippine corporation
could be said to have anywhere was in Ohio, where its president
conducted the corporation's activities.01 Thus, the Court's deci-
sion affords little guidance regarding the scope of dispute-blind
jurisdiction.
One other Supreme Court decision dealt with, but rejected,
an assertion of general jurisdiction. In Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v Hall,"°2 the defendant foreign corporation bought heli-
copters in Texas, but had few other contacts with that state.'
The Texas Supreme Court, reversing its original stance, never-
theless held that the Colombian enterprise was subject to general
jurisdiction.0 4 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the proposition
that Texas courts could rely on general jurisdiction to adjudicate
the Colombian defendant's liability for wrongful death on account
of a helicopter crash in Peru."5
As if to underline the Justices' confusion about jurisdictional
concepts, the Helicopteros majority inexplicably relied on a pre-
International Shoe precedent for its conclusion.0 6 Yet, the defen-
dant's tenuous relationship with the forum notwithstanding, Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent argued that the Texas court could have
asserted general as well as specific jurisdiction.0 7 Moreover, that
a plurality of the Court, in Burnham v Superior Court of Califor-
99 342 US 437 (1952).
100 Id at 447-48.
101 Id.
102 466 US 408 (1984).
103 Id at 415-16.
104 Hall v Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 638 SW2d 870, 881-82 (Tex 1982)
(Campbell concurring).
105 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 US at 416 (because plaintiffs failed to
assert specific jurisdiction, the majority opinion never dealt with this point).
106 See id at 417-18, relying on Rosenberg Brothers & Co v Curtis Brown Co, 260 US
516, 518 (1923).
107 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 US at 420-24 ("the undisputed contacts
in this case ... are sufficiently important ... to make it ... fair and reasonable ... to
assert personal jurisdiction"), relying on Perkins, 342 US at 438, 445 and Rosenberg
Brothers & Co, 260 US at 518.
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nia,"° resuscitated Pennoyer "tag" jurisdiction-a species of gen-
eral jurisdiction"'0 -suggests that the Justices are not particu-
larly concerned about the fact that truly minimal contacts may
render a nonresident defendant amenable to wide-ranging juris-
dictional assertions.
D. The Restatements
The Court's skimpy case law leaves unanswered a number of
obvious questions, such as the potential exercise of general juris-
diction over foreign multinational enterprises that sell large
quantities of their products in the United States. Can, for in-
stance, any plaintiff who was injured by a car manufactured in
Wolfsburg, Germany sue the Volkwagenwerke AG in whatever
state offers the best recovery? And should it matter whether the
nonresident corporation's "continuous and systematic" forum
business is conducted by individuals or subsidiaries? Do a sub-
sidiary's activities render the parent amenable to general juris-
diction on any cause of action, wherever it has "arisen"?" The
Restatements fail to shed much light on the matter. The Second
Conflicts Restatement contains the following terse statement:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation which does business in the state with
respect to causes of action that do not arise from the busi-
ness done in the state if this business is so continuous and
substantial as to make it reasonable for the state to exer-
cise jurisdiction.11'
108 495 US 604, 607 (Scalia) (plurality), 628 (White concurring) (1990).
109 See Eugene F. Scoles, et al, Conflict of Laws § 6.2 (West 3d ed 2000) (describing
"transient" jurisdiction based on in-state service as a "truly" general basis of jurisdiction).
110 Judicial opinion on this point is split. Some courts cite Cannon Manufacturing Co v
Cudahy Packing Co, 267 US 333 (1925), a pre-International Shoe case, for the proposition
that the mere fact of stock ownership in a wholly-owned subsidiary does not render a
nonresident corporation amenable to even specific jurisdiction. See, for example, Delagi v
Volkswagenwerk, AG, 283 NE2d 432 (NY 1972) (denying jurisdiction in New York over
German corporations which manufactured automobiles in Germany and imported them
into the United States through a New Jersey subsidiary). Others suggest that business
done by a subsidiary may allow the exercise of general jurisdiction over the parent. See,
for example, Velandra v Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F2d 292 (6th Cir 1964)
(holding that subsidiary corporation doing business within state insufficient to establish
jurisdiction over parent manufacturer); Gallager v Mazda Motor of America Inc, 781 F
Supp 1079 (E D Pa 1992) (imputing jurisdictional contacts of subsidiary to corporate par-
ent).
ill Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 47(2) (1971).
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The Judgments Restatement simply incorporates the Conflicts
Restatement by reference. '12 The Foreign Relations Law Re-
statement would subject any foreign individual or entity to gen-
eral jurisdiction if he, she or it "regularly carries on business
within the state."'13 While that Restatement purports to set forth
principles of international law, its reporters have failed to men-
tion the discrepancy between the American and foreign views on
that point. Of course, these Restatements were published before
the Supreme Court's decision in the Helicopteros case, which
casts doubt on their authoritative value.
E. Academic Critics
The Supreme Court case law, the Restatements and the aca-
demic literature largely agree that foreign corporations doing a
sufficient volume of business are subject to general in personam
jurisdiction even though they are neither incorporated nor have
their principal place of business within the forum state. Yet,
given the vast potential scope of general jurisdiction, it is no
wonder that some American scholars have questioned the con-
ventional wisdom that the mere fact of some continuous and sys-
tematic activities in the forum suffice to hold foreign corporations
amenable to local suits that are unrelated to such business."1
Thirty-five years ago, von Mehren and Trautman already main-
tained that only the home state ought to be able to exercise such
jurisdiction.115 Subsequently, Twitchell argued that a broader test
for specific jurisdiction should make the notion of general juris-
diction largely dispensable." 6 Others have gone so far as to advo-
cate elimination of the entire notion of general jurisdiction." '
That, of course, would pour the baby out with the bath water.
Why should a plaintiff be unable to sue a corporation at its prin-
cipal place of business, or an individual at his domicile, on any
cause of action? As this consideration suggests, total abolition
seems hardly warranted, especially if one considers that other
112 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 5 (1982).
113 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 421(2)(h) (1947).
114 See, for example, Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-
Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U Chi Legal F 171.
115 See von Mehren and Trautman, 79 Harv L Rev at 1141-44, 1179. (cited in note 5).
116 Twitchell, 101 Harv L Rev at 633, 665-67 (cited in note 6) (cautioning against the
abolishment of general jurisdiction).
117 See, for example, Harold G. Maier and Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for
Judicial Jurisdiction of Choice of Law, 39 Am J Comp L 249, 271-80 (1991) (arguing that
"the exercise of general jurisdiction, standing alone, necessarily violates the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution").
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nations not only recognize this basis of jurisdiction but consider
the maxim actor sequitur forum rei to be a fundamental tenet of
procedural law."' Rather, the question is whether, in light of the
views that prevail abroad, the assertion of general jurisdiction
over corporations doing business in the United States is not suffi-
ciently exorbitant to require some adjustments.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF
JURISDICTIONAL EXORBITANCE
A. Cosf Fan Tutte
Desirable as narrowing the scope of general jurisdiction
might be, it may seem that there is no pressing need for such re-
form. No doubt, our expansive ideas about its scope may hurt for-
eign defendants. This country is, however, not the only one with
overly broad jurisdictional rules. As a glance at Article 3 of the
Brussels"' and Lugano 2 ° Conventions shows, other nations boast
of equally, or even more, exorbitant bases. 2' In that provision one
encounters, among other things, national rules to the effect that
the presence of assets in Germany, a plaintiff's residence in
France, or personal service in the United Kingdom each allows
European courts to entertain general in personam jurisdiction
over foreign individuals and enterprises.'22 To be sure, judgments
based on such a tenuous foundation may not be recognized
abroad, so that, after vigorous litigation, a judgment creditor
might be deprived of the fruits of his victory.'23 This is true for
European jurisdictional exorbitance as well as our own.'24 In
practice, however, nonrecognition abroad is usually not a major
concern to many American plaintiffs, such as those who sue on
account of injuries caused by defective products manufactured by
118 See Pfeiffer, Internationale Zustandigkeit at 329-31 (cited in note 3).
119 See European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Brussels Convention"), 1972 OJ (L 229) 32,
reprinted in 8 ILM 229 (1968). The Brussels Convention has been amended since 1968 and
the current consolidated text may be found at 1990 OJ (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 ILM 1413
(1990).
120 See European Communities-European Free Trade Assosiation Convention on Ju-
risdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Lugano
Convention"), 1988 OJ (L 319) 9, 28 ILM 620 (1988).
121 See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 Brooklyn J Intl L
111, 115-16 (1998).
122 Id.
123 For a general discussion, see Mathias Reimann, Conflict of Laws in Western Europe
149-50 (Transnational 1995).
124 Id.
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a foreign enterprise-alien entities that are amenable to general
jurisdiction in the United States tend to have sufficient state-side
assets to assure the successful plaintiff's full recovery.
B. Law Reform via a Judgments Recognition Convention?
Exorbitance, however, becomes problematic whenever an ef-
fort is launched to assure the regional or worldwide recognition of
foreign judgments. Thus, within the European Union, the exorbi-
tant French, German and British rules listed in Article 3 of the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions had to give way to more sensi-
ble heads of jurisdiction, at least as far as corporate or individual
defendants domiciled in the signatory states are concerned.'25
Similarly, the broad sweep of American general jurisdiction be-
came problematic when this country began to negotiate with
other nations for an international judgments recognition conven-
tion under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law.'26 In the Hague, the American delegation aimed
for a "mixed convention," in other words one that would not only
contain a "white" list of approved heads of jurisdiction but would
also tolerate, up to a point, national idiosyncracies.'27 Jurisdic-
tional bases falling within this idiosyncratic category are enu-
merated in a "gray" list; judgments rendered on any of these
bases need not be recognized by the other signatory states. 28
There was, however, general agreement that certain jurisdic-
tional assertions are sufficiently exorbitant to merit inclusion in a
"black" list that the signatories may not invoke against residents
and entities of member states.'29 After setting forth the general
principle that jurisdiction requires a "substantial connection" be-
tween the forum and a dispute, Article 18 of the Draft Convention
lists several examples of prohibited bases. As one might expect,
that list, as it stands, includes-as do the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions-jurisdictional privileges that favor forum residents
and nationals as well as German asset-based and British "tag"
125 Id.
126 See Juenger, 24 Brooklyn J Intl L at 117-18 (cited in note 121) (discussing the
difficulty of exporting the American jurisdictional model).
127 Id at 114-16, 118-20 (discussing unwillingness of American delegates to depart
from the American jurisdictional model).
128 Id at 119 (explaining that "between the recognized and the impermissible heads of
jurisdiction there would be a "gray zone").
129 Id at 118-20.
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jurisdiction.3 ° American-style "doing business" general jurisdic-
tion, however, also struck the delegates from other countries rep-
resented in the Hague Conference as sufficiently exorbitant to
merit blacklisting.
Accordingly, Article 18 of the current draft convention pro-
vides, in relevant part:
Prohibited grounds of jurisdiction
1. Where the defendant is habitually resident in a Con-
tracting State, the application of a rule of jurisdic-
tion provided for under the national law of a Con-
tracting State is prohibited if there is no substantial
connection between that State and the dispute.
2. In particular, jurisdiction shall not be exercised by
the courts of a Contracting State on the basis solely
of one or more of the following...
e) the carrying on of commercial or other activities
by the defendant in that State, except where the
dispute is directly related to those activi-
ties .... "'
The accompanying report'32 by Professors Peter Nygh and
Fausto Pocar explains the reasons for including "doing business"
general jurisdiction as follows: "This ground of jurisdiction [doing
business] . .. makes it possible in some situations to bring a suit
against the defendant even when the claim has no specific rela-
tionship with the activity carried on by the defendant in the State
of the court seised."133 They also conclude that the application of
the "doing business" standard is worrisome because of the diffi-
culties in "determining the quality and quantity of activity which
is needed ... ; this again has to be left to the court seised to de-
cide." 134 Thus, the inclusion of "doing business" jurisdiction risks
130 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Art 18 (adopted Oct
30, 1999), available online at <http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html> (visited
Dec 14, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
131 Id.
132 Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commission on the Prelimi-
nary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters ("Report of the Special Commission"), available online at <ftp://hcch.net/doc/
jdgmpdll.doc> (visited Nov 25, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
133 Id at 77.
134 Id.
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increased disputes between parties which run counter to the pur-
pose of the Convention. As Professors Nygh and Pocar conclude:
It should be explained that the connection to the defen-
dant's activity in the State is prohibited only for the pur-
pose of founding a general jurisdiction .... The prohibi-
tion would not be justified if the dispute is related to that
activity or is directly connected to it. Jurisdiction would
not in fact be based on "doing business[,"] but rather on
"transacting business[,"] which may reflect a sufficient
link between the dispute and the State in which the activ-
ity is carried on. ... 135
In other words, "transacting business," as a basis for specific jur-
isdiction falls within the "grey zone," so that signatories remain
free to employ it against enterprises from other signatory states,
even though a judgment rendered on this basis is not entitled to
automatic recognition.
13 6
C. The Prospects of a Hague Convention
Including the "transaction of business" in the draft conven-
tion's "gray" list, while relegating the assertion of general juris-
diction for "doing business" among the prohibited exorbitant
heads of jurisdiction, should please the critics of America's overly
broad notions of general jurisdiction. This common-sensical com-
promise solution, however, as well as the attempt to devise more
precise jurisdictional provisions than our amorphous "minimum
contacts" cum "purposeful availment/direction," has caused con-
sternation within the United States. For example, the represen-
135 Id at 78. "Transacting business" includes, for purposes of specific jurisdiction, the
activities of subsidiaries. As the report by Professors Nygh and Pocar notes: "a party
which seeks to derive gain from commercial activities in a particular State should be sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of that State in respect of claims arising out of those activities,
notwithstanding the formal means employed for conducting those commercial activities."
Id at 56.
136 The report also notes the advantage of relying on the more settled traditional con-
cepts similar to those used in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, which are included in
the Convention's "white" list of bases that require recognition of the resulting judgment:
On the other hand, the words "branch, agency or other establishment ...
depend primarily on the formal legal relationship between the subordi-
nate entity and the defendant. The advantage of such a formal approach
is that one can arrange one's affairs to avoid jurisdiction without losing
commercial advantage in the state where the activity takes place. The
disadvantage to consumers and other plaintiffs in that state is obvious.
Report of the Special Commission at 56 (cited in note 132).
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tative of the U.S. Department of State has sharply criticized vari-
ous aspects of the draft convention. As regards jurisdiction, the
Department's communication states, in pertinent part:
We believe that unless there is a clear well-defined per-
mitted area of jurisdiction that allows for growth and de-
velopment in the future, the convention will not have the
flexibility it needs to meet the requirements of a changing
world .... Regrettably, the current draft creates rigid
principles and factors for prohibiting jurisdiction .... We
detected very limited support for [the draft's rules on
"transacting business"] .... Yet even that language may
not go far enough to satisfy the litigating bar .... This ar-
ticle ties ... a minimum legal standard for jurisdiction to
a long illustrative list of ... national jurisdictional prac-
tices... [that] are then declared not to meet the minimum
standards.13'
This language suggests that our State Department is not
only concerned about a possible rejection of the draft convention's
"transaction of business" provision but would also like to remove
"doing business" general jurisdiction from the list of exorbitant
bases. In later testimony before the House of Representatives, the
Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law concluded,
after consultations with industry, consumer and legal groups,
that "the draft convention is not close to being ratifiable in the
United States and cannot be an effective vehicle for final negotia-
tions."' 3 Obviously, American-style general jurisdiction was not
the only reason for this assessment. Concerns about limiting ex-
orbitant American jurisdictional bases did, however, doubtless
play a role. Once the Supreme Court condones a particular juris-
dictional practice, vested interests inevitably attach to it. Human
rights groups have pressed for retaining Pennoyer-style tag juris-
diction to vindicate civil causes of action for human rights viola-
137 Letter of Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law,
U.S. Department of State dated February 22, 2000 to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, available online at <www.cptech.
org/ecom/jurisdiction/Kovarletter.html> (visited Nov 7, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
138 See Testimony of Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private Interna-
tional Law, U.S. Department of State, Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellec-
tual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, avail-
able online at <http:www.house.gov/judiciary/kova0629.htm> (visited May 14, 2001) [on
file with U Chi Legal F).
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tions.'39 In fact, their concerns have induced alternative proposals
that are included as bracketed provisions in the current draft. 4 °
Other groups are equally interested in retaining "doing business"
general jurisdiction in the gray list of permitted bases rather
than relegating it to the blacklist that would entirely prohibit its
use.
14 1
The Assistant Legal Adviser mentions a number of organiza-
tions from whom the Department of State solicited opinions on
the proposed judgments convention, one of which was the Asso-
ciation of Trial Lawyers of America."' Obviously, in products li-
ability litigation against foreign manufacturers, for instance, the
possibility of relying on general jurisdiction is of considerable
practical importance.* Even if a particular court might be skepti-
cal about the propriety of exercising it, or is inclined to dismiss a
suit brought on this basis on forum non conveniens grounds, the
in terrorem effect of potential litigation in the United States
should not be underrated. Abroad such American peculiarities as
jury trials in civil matters, which often produce verdicts that by
foreign standards are excessive, punitive damages and our wide-
ranging discovery are viewed with dismay.' Hence the mere
prospect of a lawsuit in this country may prompt alien defendants
to settle rather than incur the risk that a case will indeed be tried
here. Other areas of interest to attorneys are actions against for-
eign enterprises that employed slave labor or violate American
antitrust laws. The latter should also interest the "federal agen-
cies with substantial litigation interests,"44 to which the Assis-
tant Legal Adviser refers. 4 1
139 See Report of the Special Commission at 80 (cited in note 132).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See Testimony of Jeffrey D. Kovar at n 2 (cited in note 138) (listing organizations
and interest groups with whom the U.S. State Department has consulted regarding the
Hague Conference negotiations).
143 For a general discussion, see Rolf Sturner, Some European Remarks on a New Joint
Proposal of the American Law Institute and Unidroit, 34 Intl Law 1071, 1074 & n 13 ("For
European continental critics this [jury trial] sometimes appears to be more of a drama
than a due process of law to find the truth and to give a fair judgment.").
144 See Testimony of Jeffrey D. Kovar (cited in note 138) (identifying "federal agencies
with substantial litigation interests as one of the groups with whom the U.S. Department
of State has consulted").
145 Equally interested are counsel who represent clients that have private causes of
action for such violations. See William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judg-
ments Convention, 32 L & Pol in Intl Bus 363, 380 (2001) (noting that the "net effect" of
the Draft Convention on antitrust cases involving foreign corporations would probably be
very limited).
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D. Congressional Action
Overly aggressive jurisdictional assertions that are incom-
patible with prevailing notions in other nations are not the only
reasons to explain why the prospects of reaching a consensus in
The Hague look dim and the Senate is unlikely give its advice
and consent.146 Accordingly, the American delegation cannot show
the same measure of flexibility it expects from the other dele-
gates. Its hands are tied by precedents, even if a particular basis
may be perfectly acceptable to the vast majority of, or even all,
foreign nations. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Hague
negotiations will prompt what may well be viewed as an overdue
reform of domestic jurisdictional law.
But there remains another avenue to accomplish this end.
The American Law Institute has on the drawing board a project
envisaging the preparation of draft legislation to be submitted to
Congress that would federalize the American law of judgments
recognition, an area currently left to the states.14 ' Such an act
would either incorporate the Hague Convention into domestic law
or, in the likely event that the efforts in The Hague should foun-
der, lay down appropriate federal rules. At this stage, it is diffi-
cult to gauge the prospects of such legislation. At any rate, to the
extent that it would attempt to reduce the scope of general juris-
diction, it too is bound to clash with vested interests. Moreover,
Congress is not only busy with many other things, but may also
hesitate to encroach on states' rights. Judgments recognition has
long been perceived to be within the province of the states, as
ample case law and numerous legislative enactments demon-
146 Another major reason is rooted in the Supreme Court's insistence on the constitu-
tional nature of our jurisdictional law. Our notions are not only too broad, but they may
also be too narrow, as suggested by a comparison of heads of jurisdiction used, for exam-
ple, in Europe. As the Assistant Legal Adviser has noted:
Because the Due Process Clause puts limits on the extension over defen-
dants without a substantial link to the forum, the United States is unable
to accept certain grounds of jurisdiction as they are applied in Europe
under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. For example, we cannot,
consistent with the Constitution, accept tort jurisdiction based solely on
the place of injury, or contract jurisdictions based solely on place of per-
formance stated in the contract.
Testimony of Jeffrey D. Kovar (cited in note 138).
147 See Andreas F. Lowenfield and Linda Silberman, Memorandum to the Council re
Proposal for Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention (Nov 20, 1998), available
online at <http://www.ali.orglali/1999_Lowenl.htm> (visited Nov 7, 2001) [on file with U
Chi Legal F].
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strate.148 But even if the Congress should be inclined to federalize
judgments recognition, it seems unlikely that it would use the
occasion to reform the law of jurisdiction. Apart from states'
rights considerations, given the Supreme Court's insistence on
the constitutional nature of jurisdictional law, congressional ac-
tion might amount to an exercise in futility.
E. The Supreme Court
Thus, it seems that only the Supreme Court can remedy the
situation it has created. In the future, it could conceivably choose
to follow the suggestions of legal writers and revise its views on
general jurisdiction. 149 That, however, seems quite unlikely. It
took the Court sixty-seven years to discard the obviously mis-
guided Pennoyer principles. For the next fifty-six years it has
struggled, less than successfully, to make those principles it
adopted in International Shoe work. Not only do the Justices
seem disinclined to resort to a comparative approach to guide ju-
risdictional reform, but if past decisions are any indication, their
grasp of jurisdictional ideas is tenuous at best. Moreover, at pre-
sent they happen to be preoccupied with topics of greater political
import than the intricacies of civil procedure.15 But even if they
were inclined to devote their efforts to the reform of the American
law of jurisdiction, they might find it difficult to deal with the
subject. Neither International Shoe nor subsequent precedents
have established a clear line of demarcation between general and
specific jurisdiction. Nor have legal writers, who hold widely di-
verging views on this point, 5' been able to clarify what belongs to
one category and what to the other. In the absence of a scholarly
consensus on that point, the Court cannot be expected to clarify
the subject at any time in the foreseeable future.
148 For a general discussion, see Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev 1 (cited in note 1).
149 See Part III F.
150 Important decisions currently on the Court's docket include Simmons-Harris v
Zelman, 234 F3d 945 (6th Cir 2000), cert granted 122 S Ct 23 (2001) (school vouchers) and
Rucker v Davis, 237 F3d 1113 (9th Cir 2001), cert granted as Department of Housing and
Urban Development v Rucker, 122 S Ct 24 (2001) (eviction of public housing tenants for
drug related activity).
151 See Part III E.
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CONCLUSION
Concluding allows me an opportunity to offer some observa-
tions on Professor Epstein's paper'52 and to revisit the themes of
this essay. It seems extraordinarily unlikely that Professor Ep-
stein's proposed resurrection of an "implied" or "hypothetical"
consent principle will heal American jurisdiction's self-inflicted
wounds.
A major difficulty is a small matter of history: "consent" has
been tried before as a unifying jurisdictional principle. Now as to
actual consent, I heartily agree that parties ought to be able to
engage in real bargaining over the place of suit. I have many
times commented favorably on the Supreme Court's decision in
The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co, 5 ' where two companies-one
American and the other German-of equal bargaining power
agreed in advance to litigate their dispute in England and the
Supreme Court held them to their bargain.' Law and economics,
however, has never been put to worse use than in the Supreme
Court's decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v Shute.'55 Profes-
sor Epstein nonetheless regards Carnival Cruise Lines as so obvi-
ously correct that he wonders why it even required the Supreme
Court's intervention to establish the principle.'56 The short an-
swer, of course, is that the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Carnival
Cruise Lines'5' had it right in refusing to enforce the purported
forum-selection clause on the grounds that the consumer was at
such a disadvantage that the bargain ought not be enforced. 5 '
Indeed, even law-and-economics icon Judge Posner commented on
the Ninth Circuit opinion: "If ever there was a case for stretching
152 Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U Chi
Legal F 1.
153 407 US 1 (1972).
154 See, for example, Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Choice of Law in the Americas, 45
Am J Comp L 195, 199 (1997) (describing The Bremen as a "landmark" case).
155 499 US 585 (1991). See Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev at 16 (cited in note 1) ("Has law
and economics ever been put to worse use than in Justice Blackmun's opinion in Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v Shute?"). See also Russell J. Weintraub, Case One: Choice of Forum
Clauses, 29 New Eng L Rev 553, 555 (1995) ("Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585 (1991), applying economic theory apparently gleaned from the back of a bubble
gum wrapper, enforced the clause.").
156 Epstein, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 10 (cited in note 152) ("In my view, the outcome of
[Carnival Cruise Lines] is so clearly correct that it is hard to understand why it had to be
litigated to the Supreme Court in the first place.").
157 Shute v Carnival Cruise Lines Inc, 897 F2d 377 (9th Cir 1990).
158 Id at 387-89 (discussing federal cases reviewing similar forum selection clauses
and concluding that "this case suggests the sort of disparity in bargaining power that
justifies setting aside the forum selection provision").
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the concept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was
Shute; and perhaps no stretch was necessary."'59 A close examina-
tion of the facts of the case reveals that the clause was not part of
a two-sided exchange even in the fictional sense: the Shutes did
not get notice of the forum-selection clause until after they had
paid their money and no refund was possible.
16
When one moves away from the relatively narrow area of fo-
rum-selection clauses any pretense of actual consent disappears.
In its place appear wholly fictional notions of "implied" and "hy-
pothetical" consent. Other modern scholars have occasionally
suggested a resurrection of these metaphors.'61 "Consent" of this
kind does not, however, seem to be a promising foundation upon
which to build the house of jurisdiction, and this is why the Su-
preme Court abandoned the metaphor after a century or so of
experimenting with it.
At bottom, Professor Epstein's proposal is infected with the
same disease that afflicts the current regime. Whether the meta-
phor is power, consent, "purposeful availment," or "minimum con-
tacts," the fundamental problem is that the Supreme Court, act-
ing on the doubtful premise that the Due Process Clause requires
the constitutionalization of jurisdictional doctrine, remains the
final arbiter. If one wishes, as does Professor Epstein, to make
the current jurisdictional regime more efficient, then the proper
target is the transaction costs generated by the unnecessary un-
certainties in the law caused by judicially invented metaphors.
An overactive and vacillating judiciary has left the United States
without the hope of any meaningful statutory guidance on the
subject.162 As a result, jurisdiction remains the perpetual joker in
the deck by giving the losing party an incentive to continue liti-
gating and appealing-on an issue wholly divorced from the mer-
its of a case-because a jurisdictional reversal might force the
parties to throw their cards back in the pile for a new deal.163
159 Northwestern National Insurance Co v Donavan, 916 F2d 372, 376 (7th Cir 1990).
160 See Shute, 897 F2d at 389 n 11. See also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection
Agreements in the Federal Courts after Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional
Reform, 67 Wash L Rev 55, 59, 73 (1992).
161 See, for example, Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 57 Geo Wash L Rev 849, 898-905 (1989) (arguing that "political consent" is a
necessary and proper basis for personal jurisdiction).
162 Juenger, 65 U Colo L Rev at 22 (cited in note 1).
163 For empirical verification that procedural statutes provide greater predictability
than the common law counterparts, see Patrick J. Borchers, Louisiana's Conflicts Codifi-
cation: Some Empirical Observations Regarding Decisional Predictability, 60 La L Rev
1061 (2000).
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Indeed, Professor Epstein's own discussion of tort problems
suggests that his proposal might be worse than the current
mess.' While his paper contains extensive critiques of the Su-
preme Court's non-tort jurisdictional cases, when Professor Ep-
stein confronts torts he resorts to a notion of "hypothetical" con-
sent and mostly discusses fictional instead of real cases. But even
with an admittedly simple example---"X in state A shoots a gun
that hits Y in state B"' 65-the consent metaphor struggles might-
ily to solve the problem of whether Y can sue at home or must go
to tortfeasor X's state.'66 The minimum contacts test has, at least,
been able to generate a fairly predictable "effects" test for inten-
tional torts.'67 If conceptual gymnastics are needed to solve simple
problems, the mind boggles at the thought of entrusting courts
armed with the consent metaphor to resolve cross-border envi-
ronmental torts, multistate products liability actions and all the
other stuff of modern tort litigation. Would not it be better to do
as the Europeans have done and dispense with the metaphors
and the consequent judicially-created uncertainty and instead
draft some relatively clear statutory rules? The verdict of history
and the comparative method is a resounding "yes."
164 Epstein, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 30-31 (cited in note 152).
165 Id at 30.
166 Id.
167 See Scoles, et al, Conflict of Laws § 7.3 at 360-63 (cited in note 109) ("The very
nature of these torts usually locates the actions and the consequences in one place. As a
result, courts have had little difficulty asserting jurisdiction over a defendant, if the tort
took place in the forum, even if the defendant was there only casually.").
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